The Trump administration's Super Intelligence Force is preparing a broader policy framework covering technology safety, cybersecurity, economic interests and the future of work. Scott Kupor, director of the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM), discussed the initiative during an appearance on CNN's The Lead with Jake Tapper, explaining how the government intends to oversee the development and deployment of superintelligence while maintaining America's competitive position.
Kupor said the group will examine how government agencies and technology companies should work together, particularly when advanced systems create security concerns or affect critical infrastructure. He also described the administration's expectations for companies that have accepted voluntary safety commitments, emphasizing independent reviews and the responsibility of corporate boards. OPM published the interview account on October 29, 2026.
A new policy initiative
The interview focused on President Donald Trump's Super Intelligence Force and the administration's approach to balancing technological progress with public protection. Kupor presented the initiative as more than an endorsement of commitments already made by technology companies. Its purpose, he explained, is to determine which government policies are needed to address the challenges associated with superintelligence.
The director also addressed the terminology surrounding the initiative. When asked about Trump's use of the expression superintelligence, he acknowledged that SI had become the administration's preferred abbreviation. A separate question concerned whether businesses might change their names to reflect the terminology. Kupor referred to Elon Musk's company and said he believed it had adopted the name X SI.
He was also asked whether using the established expression artificial intelligence could lead to penalties. Kupor did not provide a definitive answer, explaining that he had not received a briefing on that particular issue and directing the question toward the president.
These exchanges highlighted the terminology attracting attention around the initiative, but Kupor's main focus remained the practical responsibilities of government and industry. He described the task force as a mechanism for developing policies rather than simply recognizing existing industry agreements.
Who leads the force
Kupor identified himself as one of four people involved in directing the initiative. The other participants he named were Jay Clayton, Emil Michael, and Andrew Ferguson, who is associated with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).
Their work will involve identifying a comprehensive set of measures that can accommodate two objectives expressed by Trump. The first is preserving America's ability to compete successfully in the superintelligence field. The second is ensuring that technological development takes account of the country's economic and natural sovereignty interests.
Kupor described these objectives as considerations that must be addressed together. In other words, the administration wants the United States to remain competitive without treating technological advancement as separate from national interests and public responsibilities.
The director did not present a completed policy package during the interview. Instead, he described an ongoing process in which the task force will consider what rules, procedures and coordination arrangements are appropriate. This distinction is important because the initiative's announced responsibilities extend beyond the commitments that companies have already signed.
Independent company oversight
One of the central subjects in the interview was the voluntary safety commitments accepted by technology companies. Kupor argued that these arrangements should not be understood as promises that businesses can simply evaluate and enforce internally.
According to his explanation, the agreements include provisions for independent third-party auditors to examine company practices. These reviewers are expected to assess whether businesses are meeting their commitments and identify problems requiring attention.
Kupor drew a comparison with the oversight arrangements commonly associated with publicly traded corporations. In those settings, external auditors generally report to company boards. If an independent security review identifies a significant weakness, the board is expected to respond rather than ignore the findings.
He said the commitments therefore carry legal significance through existing corporate responsibilities. His argument was that board members already have fiduciary and other duties that require them to act appropriately when serious issues are brought to their attention.
This approach gives independent assessment an important place in the administration's expectations for the industry. It also connects corporate accountability with the wider policy work being undertaken by the task force.
However, Kupor made clear that external audits alone would not complete the government's work. The administration still needs to establish how companies should communicate problems, how officials should respond and which agencies should become involved in different circumstances.
Reporting safety incidents
A major part of the task force's planned agenda concerns the reporting of incidents involving superintelligence models. Kupor said the group intends to examine how companies should notify the government when they discover potentially serious problems.
He described the desired arrangement as a notification framework. Under such a system, companies would be encouraged to communicate relevant incidents instead of keeping important information within their own organizations. The government would then need procedures for evaluating reports and deciding what action should follow.
The response could involve different departments depending on the nature of an incident. Kupor used the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as an example, explaining that an issue connected to aviation might require communication with the Department of Transportation.
The task force therefore expects to consult several groups rather than rely on a single government office. These discussions are intended to include companies developing models, federal departments and intelligence organizations. Each participant may have different information requirements and responsibilities.
Kupor also highlighted businesses outside the technology sector. He specifically mentioned financial services, oil and gas operations, and energy companies as industries where security incidents involving advanced technology could have serious consequences.
His own contribution to this part of the initiative will include engagement with infrastructure businesses. The objective is to understand their exposure to potential problems and determine how information should move between private companies and government officials.
Preparing for cyber threats
The discussion also covered malicious actors who might misuse advanced technology and the possibility of cyberattacks. Kupor said the government already has legal mechanisms that can be applied when individuals or groups engage in harmful activity.
He pointed to criminal enforcement powers available through the Department of Justice (DOJ) and civil enforcement mechanisms associated with the FTC. These existing legal authorities provide routes for pursuing people who misuse technology, even when the underlying tools were developed by legitimate companies.
Kupor distinguished between the responsibility of businesses to release products they consider appropriate for consumer use and the actions of outside individuals who might exploit those products. In his view, companies have a basic obligation to exercise care when making technology available, while the government can use existing laws against malicious users.
Cybersecurity requires an additional layer of preparation. The administration wants stronger practical measures behind company activities, together with notification procedures and contingency arrangements involving different federal agencies.
Such plans would help officials understand what is happening when a security incident occurs and establish which organizations should respond. Kupor emphasized that government departments need sufficient information and preparation to handle a range of possible situations.
The task force's work on reporting, communication and emergency planning is therefore closely connected to its broader safety objectives. Identifying a threat is only one part of the process; the government must also be able to share information and coordinate an effective response.
Employment and retraining
Another issue raised during the CNN appearance was the possible effect of superintelligence on employment. Kupor acknowledged that workers are concerned about how technological developments could change the labor market, but he challenged predictions that widespread job losses had already begun.
He referred to warnings made approximately 18 months earlier, including comments by Dario, about a potential employment crisis. Kupor said the available employment data had not shown the expected outcome. Instead, he argued, job numbers had risen alongside the development of superintelligence.
He presented this as consistent with a pattern he associates with earlier technological changes. New technologies can create opportunities and increase employment rather than automatically eliminate jobs. Nevertheless, he did not dismiss public concerns about future disruption.
Kupor pointed to retraining initiatives being developed by the Department of Labor. He said additional attention to these programs would come from the department and that workforce preparation would receive direct consideration within the Super Intelligence Force's activities.
The issue connects the administration's technology strategy with its responsibilities toward workers. Even if current employment figures do not demonstrate the large-scale disruption previously predicted, the government still needs to consider how people can adapt when industries and job requirements change.
Kupor did not provide employment forecasts, numerical targets or a detailed timetable for retraining measures during the interview. His comments instead established workforce preparation as one of the subjects the task force intends to address.
What happens next
OPM's account of the interview presents the Super Intelligence Force as an initiative with several connected areas of responsibility. Its members are expected to examine company safety practices, develop incident reporting arrangements, coordinate government responses and consider the consequences of technological change for workers and critical industries.
The administration also intends to involve organizations beyond the immediate technology sector. Financial institutions, energy businesses and other infrastructure operators are relevant because problems involving advanced systems could affect services far beyond the companies that build the models.
Kupor's comments indicate that the government wants to establish channels through which information can be reported, evaluated and acted upon. The work will require discussions between private companies and multiple federal bodies, including intelligence agencies and departments responsible for specific areas of infrastructure.
The interview did not announce a final set of regulations or provide a date for completing the task force's recommendations. It instead outlined the subjects that officials intend to investigate and the responsibilities they expect companies and government organizations to fulfill.
Why it matters
The Super Intelligence Force could become an important part of how the Trump administration approaches the relationship between technological competition and public safety. Kupor's explanation suggests that the government's strategy will involve more than encouraging companies to make voluntary promises. Independent audits, corporate accountability, incident notifications and interagency contingency planning are all part of the approach he described.
The initiative also recognizes that the consequences of superintelligence may extend well beyond the technology industry. Financial services, energy operations and other critical infrastructure could face security concerns that require coordination between private operators and public authorities.
For workers, the administration's stated intention to address retraining reflects another dimension of the transition. Kupor believes employment data so far does not support earlier predictions of an immediate job crisis, but he acknowledged that concerns about future changes deserve attention.
The central challenge for the task force is to help the United States pursue superintelligence while building the oversight, security and workforce preparations needed to manage its potential consequences. Its eventual policies will determine how these objectives are translated into practical responsibilities for companies and federal agencies.